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DOCTRINAL DOGMA: A COMPARISON OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BETWEEN FM 100-5 (DRAFT) AND JOINT PUB 3-0

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Craig H. Bird
Aviation**



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United States Army Command and General Staff
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This monograph suggests that Army doctrine does not support Joint doctrine in the direct approach to attacking the enemy's operational centers of gravity (COGs). It expresses the belief that there are phases of an operation in which air power should become the main effort, and ground forces the supporting effort. The doctrinal concepts listed in Joint doctrine have the potential to produce decisive victory, at a considerably lower cost than existing or proposed Army doctrine.

The doctrines of the Air Force and Navy have influenced Joint doctrine's position in favor of the direct approach, and in using air or sea power as the main effort in some phases of the campaign for achieving operational objectives. Potential enemies in the MRC regions are vulnerable to operations involving U.S. and coalition militaries' ability to dominate the air and sea dimensions, in consonance with amphibious and/or vertical turning movements.

The tremendous loss of life, and destruction of infrastructure so prevalent in ground intensive warfare impedes the NSS goals of security, and prosperity. Ground intensive wars that attack and maneuver through a series of decisive points, and then on to the COGs themselves, tend to take longer and wreak greater destruction. The existing conflict between Army doctrine and Joint doctrine holds at risk the nation's commitment to fight and win two regional conflicts, near simultaneously, as expressed in the NSS and NMS.

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction	1
II. Formation of Joint and Army Doctrine	6
A. Overview	6
B. U.S. Army Doctrine Development	8
C. U.S. Air Force Doctrine Development	12
D. U.S. Navy Doctrine Development	15
E. National Security and National Military Strategy	18
III. Strategic Considerations for Joint and Army Doctrine	20
A. The Strategic Environment as it Relates to Doctrine	20
B. The Military Strategic Environment	23
IV. A Comparison of Joint and Army Offensive Operations	
Doctrine at the Operational Level	29
A. Contrast of Joint and Army operational scope	29
B. Defeating enemy operational COGs, the direct and indirect approaches	30
C. Decisiveness of offensive operations	31
D. The nature of offensive operations in either of the MRCs is likely to be nonlinear	32
V. Implications for the Future	36
A. Breaking the dogma	36
B. Institutional challenges	38
VI. Conclusions	39
VII. Bibliography	48

I. Introduction

In consideration of the changing world of technology, political objectives and threats to American interests, there is an increasing requirement levied by political leaders, the American population and the military themselves that contemporary wars can be won more quickly, and with less bloodshed. In the post cold-war era, with the major world powers considerably reducing their militaries, this is a reasonable expectation. However, this is only one of the pressing reasons for changing the way the nation's military conducts operations and fights wars.

Although contemporary conventional threats from countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq are significant military challenges, these countries could be quickly defeated by the U.S. and coalition forces, if fought one at a time. The more serious military challenge is that these two vital regions could become embroiled in military conflicts nearly simultaneously; as outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).¹ In order for the United States to form a winning strategy in both regions, it must have (within the means available) the military capability to win in one region decisively and quickly, before shifting the weight of its combat power to the second region.

This requirement to win two conflicts nearly simultaneously, in operational environments very different from the one planned for in Europe, implies an opportunity for the U.S. military to conduct offensive operations more boldly, and with greater results today, and in the years ahead. Joint doctrine writers have realized this opportunity and made a significant shift in the ways of conducting the operational art of warfare by recognizing the increasing role of air power (Air Force, Navy, and Army Aviation). This opportunity may be missed, however, if the U.S. Army insists on holding onto the operational ideology that decisive combat operations are only won by ground maneuver forces, and supported by air and sea forces.²

This monograph will provide insights that address the question, ***Is FM 100-5 (Draft) January 1997, concept of decisive offensive operations consistent with Joint Pub 3-0?*** This paper will suggest that Army doctrine does not support Joint doctrine in the direct approach to attacking the enemy's operational centers of gravity (COGs), which is the Joint doctrine's preferred method of decisive offensive operations. This paper expresses the belief that there are phases of an operation in which air power should become the main effort, and ground forces the supporting effort. The doctrinal concepts listed in Joint doctrine have the potential to produce decisive victory, at a considerably lower cost than existing or proposed Army doctrine. The

existing conflict between Army doctrine and Joint doctrine holds at risk the nation's commitment to fight and win two regional conflicts, near simultaneously, as expressed in the NSS and NMS.³

This monograph will evaluate the above conflict in doctrines by comparing and contrasting the formation of Joint doctrine and Army doctrine, examining the influence of the NSS and NMS on military art, and comparing doctrines for offensive operations at the operational level. It will then synthesize the information to consider the employment options for the use of air power as the main effort and ground forces as the supporting effort in decisive offensive operations. Finally it will assess the contribution of decisive warfare using air power in the context of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Joint doctrine and Army doctrine are written by senior military officers who are influenced in their thinking by their particular institutional traditions and doctrine, service histories and experiences and their previous instruction in military theory. These influences shape their knowledge base and value lens, which they use to formulate and evaluate doctrinal concepts that will likely be executed within, an as yet obscure operational environment. The doctrine they formulate must function in an environment which is identified and described in part by evolving world events and in part by the NSS and NMS.

The NSS defines the operational environment by identifying where America's vital interests lay. It provides guidance to the military as to vital geographic regions and the types of operations that the military may be expected to execute. The NMS refines the implied missions into a strategy which describes the kind of operations the military must be able to perform in order to support the NSS. This in turn provides guidance to military leaders regarding the capabilities that the military must have to achieve desired political aims. These capabilities are the combination of available forces (means) and a plan (enabled by a functioning doctrine) to use those forces effectively and efficiently (ways).

In comparing doctrine, one discovers that Joint doctrine is concerned primarily with the strategic to operational levels of warfare, and Army doctrine with the operational to tactical levels of warfare. This creates a dependence between the doctrines that implies if there is to be doctrinal cohesion, there must be a common, pragmatic methodology to conducting offensive operations. This methodology includes a common understanding of:

1. The direct and indirect approaches to defeating an enemy's operational COG.
2. The direct aspects that constitute decisive operations in a conventional war.
3. The characteristics of operations in the battlefield environment.
4. The ways in which services should work together to accomplish the military's mission.

If the methodology followed in devising doctrine is not consistent, the military machine will not work effectively or efficiently, or perhaps it will not work at all.

This monograph will assume that the NSS and NMS provide sufficient guidance to military leaders to develop doctrine, that ongoing developments in Air Force and Navy doctrine will not alter the overall relationship between the Army and Joint doctrine, and that the Army is able to organize, equip and train its soldiers to accomplish the tasks listed in FM 100-5 (draft) and those proposed by this paper. This paper will focus on the operational level of war, and in particular, decisive offensive operations in the two major regional contingencies identified in the February 1996 National Security Strategy. The criteria for consistent Joint doctrine and Army doctrine is a common understanding of:

1. Military missions that are derived from the NSS and NMS.
2. The military capabilities of potential regional threats.
3. U.S. military ways and means to achieve operational ends.
4. Military theory and how actions on the battlefield produce desired results.
5. Services roles and missions in decisive offensive operations.

The following definitions, taken from Joint doctrine, will be useful throughout this paper:

Operational Art -- The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations,

and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.⁴

Operational Level of War -- The level of war of which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.⁵

COGs -- Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.⁶

Decisive Points -- (Usually geographic in nature) Correctly identifying and controlling decisive points can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action.⁷

II. Formation of Joint and Army Doctrine

Some futurists have postulated that national strategy drives doctrinal change. They also postulate that geopolitical realities, evolving military art (articulated in doctrine), technology and human and organizational behavior combine to shape the character of the military as well.⁸ As noted in the introduction, the military leaders who write and approve doctrine are greatly influenced by

their professional knowledge and values gained through the study of military theory, the practice of past doctrine and their service histories and personal experiences in combat and training. Thus the nature of doctrinal evolution and development is determined by a broad and often diverging spectrum of outside forces combined with the dynamics of national strategy, military character and military leadership.

A. Overview

Theory is the foundation for developing military art and the lens for interpreting lessons from history. Without a common theoretical foundation, Joint and Army doctrine cannot be consistent.⁹ Theory helps to explain the anticipated conditions of combat, and postulates what is possible in future conflicts. Until recently, the theories regarding air, land and sea power have tended to explain their respective environments, relatively independent of one another.

The institutional traditions and doctrine of each service vary dramatically, and historically, they have different patterns of change. In general, service doctrines, like their theories, developed independently of one another despite a common history.¹⁰ These contrasting doctrines and traditions brought an element of creative diversity to the formation of Joint doctrine. Additionally, a new challenge

emerged out of necessity, that of attaining compatibility when service systems and doctrine operate together on the battlefield.

Senior military leaders use applicable, but often very selective, historical examples and their collective experiences to assist in accepting or rejecting different military theories to form institutional doctrine.¹¹ Within this foundation process they must decide what new concepts and ideas of warfare to implement, and which ones to ignore.

This section will look at the respective services' central theories, doctrines and histories in large scale conventional wars, including the Cold War, and how each service's unique doctrine influenced the current Joint doctrine. It will then sketch the NSS and NMS strategies and the guidance they provide military leaders for the missions they must accomplish in war, and for which doctrine must support.

B. U.S. Army Doctrine Development

(1) U.S. Army Theory

Theoretically the Army is an advocate of the military theoretician Carl von Clausewitz' premise that the highest aim in war is the disarming or destruction of the enemy.¹² This is achieved based on the idea of operational COGs (attacking the enemy's greatest concentration of combat power) and its place in the operational planning process.¹³

The Army indoctrinates its leaders with an understanding of the wartime environment, one characterized by the effects of friction (countless minor incidents)¹⁴ that hasten the onset of culmination (the inability to achieve what was planned). The corresponding effect of friction on operational objectives and battle tempo (altering the plan to accommodate the effects of friction) are taught to a lesser degree.¹⁵

Other significant military theoreticians studied by Army leaders include Antoine-Henri Jomini, Colonel Ardant du Picq, J.F.C. Fuller, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Certain concepts introduced by these military theoreticians have made a significant impact on the development of Army and Joint doctrine. Jomini's concept of decisive points to achieve positional advantage with respect to an enemy's COG, and the use of interior lines of operations to move more quickly in relation to the enemy influenced Army, as well as Navy operational maneuver doctrine.¹⁶ Du Picq showed U.S. military thinkers that moral force is the most important factor in combat;¹⁷ technologies advance, but they require the moral effect to use them in times of personal danger.¹⁸ Fuller and Hart strongly advocated the use of armored maneuver warfare, the mechanization of all military forces and the use of close air support to achieve mobility on the

battlefield -- influences more strongly felt today than ever by U.S. military planners.¹⁹

(2) Army Doctrine and Traditions

In the past, Army doctrine and traditions focused on the destruction of enemy forces through fire and maneuver tactics, as a subordinate part of operational art. Indirect attacks on enemy decisive points gain a positional advantage over the enemy, from which attacks on the COGs are possible.²⁰ This exposure makes the enemy susceptible to exploitation and pursuit operations where decisive combat and the destruction of the enemy's forces take place.²¹

In FM 100-5 (draft) Army doctrine appears to change very little from the past. There is an increased emphasis on exploitation²² and the need to include Army and Air Force air power to isolate the battlefield.²³ These concepts, however, are not new. One concept that appears to be evolving is the idea of attacking multiple decisive points simultaneously with multiple main efforts.²⁴ This concept is not discussed in Joint doctrine, but it appears similar to what the Air Force refers to as parallel warfare.²⁵

(3) Army History

U.S. Army history and its effects on senior leadership have centered on the idea of operational decisive points and the indirect attack. This idea, expressed by Clausewitz, Fuller and Hart, was central during the planning for the

breakout from Normandy in August 1944. The allies conducted a double envelopment maneuver meant to encircle approximately nineteen German divisions.²⁶ The attacks were oriented on the towns of Argentan and Falaise (decisive points) from which allied forces could gain a positional advantage to destroy the German divisions (COG).²⁷ Although the gap was never sealed off, an exploitation ensued which destroyed or captured approximately 60,000 German soldiers and the equipment of an Army Group.²⁸

The Army's leadership manual, FM 22-100, is instructive in how history validates Ardant du Picq's emphasis on moral forces in war. A cited example is how one regimental commander, Joshua Chamberlain, influenced the outcome of the battle of Gettysburg by his individual bravery and cool leadership on Little Roundtop. As FM 22-100 points out, "For a few moments, the fate of an Army and a nation rested on the shoulders of 358 farmers, woodsmen, and fishermen from Maine...led by a seminary graduate..."²⁹

Perhaps just as important to note, are the examples of history that the Army does not think validate theory. The Inchon landing and Pusan perimeter breakout during the Korean War involved nonlinear operations along multiple lines of operation.³⁰ The campaign was considered risky by many senior commanders at the time, perhaps even reckless, and it appears that the Army's senior leaders today feel the

same way because there is no doctrine to support this kind of thinking today.

The Army also appears to discredit the idea of vertical envelopment, so prevalent during the Vietnam War. Operational aerial pursuit operations like DAVY CROCKETT and CRAZY HORSE, oriented on North Vietnamese and Vietcong supply base areas (decisive points), were clearly focused on defeating North Vietnamese and Vietcong offensive forces (COG).³¹ Vertical envelopment through air assault and/or aerial fires was the main effort, while ground attacks were generally the supporting efforts.

C. U.S. Air Force Doctrine Development

(1) U.S. Air Force Theory

Early on, air power theoreticians saw the opportunity for air forces to achieve military victory, independently of ground forces, by operating as a separate service. The first of these was Giulio Douhet who proposed using air power to terrorize an enemy's population by an attack directly upon their will, through the use of a combination of high explosive, incendiary, and poison gases.³² William (Billy) Mitchell modified Douhet's methods to the neutralization and/or destruction of the enemy's means to wage war by attacking the enemy's vital centers.³³ In the late 1980s and early 1990s Air Force Colonel John A. Warden

III proposed directing decisive air power attacks upon the vulnerabilities of an enemy using a system's targeting technique not unlike that used in WWII. Colonel Warden's premise is that those vulnerabilities closest to the country's leadership are strategic in nature and lead to the quickest victory, and those that are related to the fielded army are operational in nature and lead to victory more slowly.³⁴

(2) U.S. Air Force Doctrine and Traditions

Air Force doctrine writers have been influenced by the belief that airpower by itself can attain a decisive military victory. This in turn would lead to a favorable diplomatic settlement.³⁵ This tradition is still reflected in the Air Force doctrinal manual AFM 1-1: "Any enemy with the capacity to be a threat is likely to have strategic vulnerabilities susceptible to air attack..."³⁶ Since the Vietnam war, however, the Air Force along with some Army airland battle advocates began to develop an air power doctrine around the idea of shaping or isolating the close battle with an air interdiction effort.³⁷ With technological improvements in aircraft and precision munitions, the Air Force is once again focusing its doctrinal sights on the strategic attack.³⁸

(3) U.S. Air Force History

U.S. Air Force history indicates three evolutionary phases of military art for attacking the enemy's COG: conventional strategic bombing, preparation for nuclear war and precision munitions and refined targeting techniques. These phases took place in conjunction with technological advancements in military aircraft and air dropped munitions.

The conventional strategic bombing campaigns in W.W.II³⁹ and North Vietnam,⁴⁰ using high altitude bombers and dumb bombs, was considered successful, but not decisive. Air power did not possess the capabilities for achieving decisive victory, independently of the other services efforts.

Preparation, technological advancements and training for nuclear war against the Soviet Union were core themes in the Air Force and diplomatic community during the Cold War. This was partially to offset the ground force power imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union, and to economize the arms' race by using the specter of nuclear annihilation as a deterrent to war.⁴¹

Precision munitions, air supremacy and refined targeting techniques were the hallmarks of the Gulf War air campaign.⁴² In spite of these refinements, and an intense six week bombing campaign, air power failed to produce victory.⁴³ What air power did accomplish was a significant contribution to the ground operational offensive.⁴⁴ This assessment has caused some air power advocates to raise

their sights to the opportunities and capabilities of air and ground forces in a non-linear battlefield environment; airland battle on an operational level.⁴⁵

D. U.S. Navy Doctrine Development

(1) U.S. Navy Theory

The theoreticians of interest to the Navy include Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, and Herbert Rosinski. Mahan's concept of decisive battle, and the relationship between command of the sea and a nation's commerce was underscored by the Napoleonic wars. Mahan attributed the success of the coalition arrayed against France to the battle of Trafalgar, the end result being the blockade which cut off resources to Napoleon's Army.⁴⁶ The writings of Mahan were instrumental in justifying a large U.S. naval buildup, and the types of ships constituting this buildup, in the late 19th century. Corbett has not been nearly as influential as Mahan, although his ideas have found new support in the Navy's concept of littoral operations. Corbett reveals that in war the contention of the sea is the normal condition, and that naval support to army operations is a significant objective.⁴⁷ Rosinski, postulated that the effects of sea and land power were complementary, but their doctrine should remain separate because their operational art was not complimentary.⁴⁸ He argued that in the event of

total nuclear war the U.S. would depend on the nuclear retaliation capabilities of an independent Navy to win.⁴⁹

(2) U.S. Navy Doctrine and Traditions

The Navy tradition is that doctrine existed in a relatively informal form from the Spanish - American War of 1898 until shortly before World War II.⁵⁰ There was an overwhelming consensus of professional thought centered on the understanding that naval warfare was largely a blue water enterprise that sought climactic battles between fleets on the high seas, such as those witnessed at Midway and the Coral Sea in World War II.⁵¹ This core belief permeated Navy doctrine throughout the 1980s, culminating in the 1988 Maritime Strategy which stated that in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union, Naval forces would focus on keeping the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open between the United States and Europe.⁵² Since the publication of the 1992 Navy - Marine Corps white paper, *From the Sea*, the Navy has shifted its doctrinal focus towards littoral operations, requiring the ability to secure advanced bases, airfields, and seaports, and serve as the transition force to the Army and Air Force forces arriving into a regional theater.⁵³

(3) U.S. Navy History

Following the loss of a significant part of its battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S.

Navy modified its campaign plan in the Pacific to rely on aircraft carrier operations.⁵⁴ Believing that the Japanese Navy had reached their offensive culmination point in early 1942, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King opted for a strategy of limited offensive operations and only accepted battle at Coral Sea and at Midway out of necessity.⁵⁵ These were attempts to prevent the Japanese from gaining command of the seas, more tending towards Corbett's theory that command of the sea is normally in dispute rather than Mahan's idea of climactic battle.⁵⁶

By late 1943, Admiral King, along with Admiral Chester Nimitz, concluded that the U.S. Navy was strong enough to seek decisive battle with the Japanese fleet. Thus, the U.S. Navy proceeded with the strategically offensive, and operationally decisive phase of the campaign.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the Navy missed opportunities to annihilate the Japanese fleet at Eniwetok in February 1944,⁵⁸ and again in the Marianas battles in June 1944.⁵⁹ Admiral Nimitz conferred with Admiral William F. Halsey and they determined not to let the opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet slip away again.⁶⁰

The Leyte invasion was planned by General MacArthur and executed by Army and Navy forces, but the commanders of each force failed to notice that they did not share the same vision of decisive operational objectives. To General

MacArthur it was the ground invasion and ultimate liberation of the Philippines. He ordered Admiral Halsey to support the Leyte operations by either, "Containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet."⁶¹ To Halsey, the objective of the campaign was the destruction of the Japanese fleet alone.⁶² While Halsey sought his objective, a Japanese surface force was able to sail through the San Bernadino Straits and threaten the U.S. landings on the Leyte beaches. The disaster was narrowly averted by a small U.S. naval force which sacrificed two destroyers, an escort destroyer and an escort carrier to defeat the Japanese attack.⁶³ This potential disaster could have been avoided had the commanders shared the same vision, and unity of effort.

E. National Security and National Military Strategy

(1) National Security Strategy

The impact of the NSS and NMS on the formation of Joint and Army doctrine begins with the identification of the vital interests to the United States.⁶⁴ These interests identify the most likely geographical areas of intervention and types of missions the military must perform. To military leaders and planners, the most likely areas of intervention for conventional operations are the two major regional contingency (MRC) areas.⁶⁵ These regions present politically and militarily complex environments, and

military doctrine must establish a process for fighting and winning in them. Preparations for the two MRC scenario also has collateral benefits in preparing for unforeseen threats in the near future.⁶⁶

One of the end states of the NSS is a growing economy for the U.S.⁶⁷ This creates a requirement for world markets to be able to trade with the United States, which in turn requires secure and stable societies to ensure sustained progressive growth. The overarching political aim of security and stability can only be achieved with the combined efforts of the military, and the other elements of national power.

(2) National Military Strategy

The NMS identifies eight basic strategic - operational principles for accomplishing the military's responsibilities identified in the NSS. These principles apply to the full spectrum of military actions. Those that are most closely associated with decisive offensive operations include:

Clear Objectives - Decisive Force
Wartime Power Projection
Fight Combined and Fight Joint
Win the Information War
Win the Peace⁶⁸

The NMS does not specify how the military must achieve these basic principles. They describe, not prescribe the military strategic and operational environment, and they allow for flexibility and adaptation to accommodate a variety of possible situations.⁶⁹

This method of guidance does not provide military leaders specific instructions on how they are to accomplish their tasks, but instead allows for creative solutions in response to complex situations.⁷⁰ The NMS does not cite service traditions, doctrines, histories or theory as precedent setting. It is receptive to changes in doctrine as long as the military objectives are met.

As an example of harmonizing complexity, heads of state often form political coalitions to generate military force, and to assist the diplomatic and military elements of national power make the transition from conflict to peace. The NMS recognizes and enables military commanders to harmonize the challenges of a complex and rapidly changing world using a capabilities based force. The effectiveness of Joint and Army doctrine in support of the NSS - NMS will be explored in the next section.

III. Strategic Considerations for Joint and Army Doctrine

A. The Strategic Environment as it Relates to Doctrine

The conventional military threats to the U.S. political objectives of enhancing security and promoting prosperity are identified in the two MRC scenario. For this and many other scenarios, U.S. military doctrine must consider what the military element of national power can do about the effects of:

1. Sustaining the support of the U.S. population
2. Sustaining coalition cohesion
3. Securing the political aims of global security and economic growth
4. Overcoming the threats

The support of the American public is important to any national endeavor, and perhaps none more so than in military operations. Historically, however, the will of the American public has been adversely affected by ill defined political and military objectives, protracted attrition warfare and needless bloodshed and destruction. The political failure to sustain American public support during the Vietnam war, and the resulting collapse of U.S. policy in Vietnam stands as a stark reminder that wars overseas cannot be won without the support of the people at home.

Coalition operations have the benefits of providing additional combat power and enhanced legitimacy of their collective goals and objectives, but also have some inherent weaknesses. Weaknesses unique to coalitions may be political and personality oriented, however, many of the conditions that contribute to the breakdown of coalitions mirror those that erode U.S. public support of military operations.

The U.S. political objectives of enhancing security and promoting prosperity must be observed during the conduct of military operations. Paramount to military operations in support of these objectives are the establishment and maintenance of regional security and stability.⁷¹ Global

security is at risk whenever the U.S. military is decisively engaged in a regional conflict. This may occur if the leaders of nations or groups hostile to the U.S. become belligerent because they perceive that the U.S. military is unable to cope with a regional conflict and another crisis simultaneously. The U.S. and global economies may be adversely affected by a protracted war or massive destruction of a belligerent's infrastructure.

The military characteristics common to Iran, Iraq and North Korea are the power of their land based militaries, limited but capable air forces and navies, and almost total lack of space-based intelligence assets.⁷² The nature of their military operations is characterized by a centralized command and control structure, non-professional conscript armies and high petroleum consumption rates during mobile warfare.

Within this strategic environment, and within the capabilities of the military instrument of power, doctrine must strive to create the conditions necessary to sustain will of the American public and coalition cohesion. Doctrine must also try to prevent conditions which could undermine the political aims of security and economic growth. As such, doctrine must create a process which enables military forces to achieve rapid and decisive victory, while minimizing casualties, to create conditions that maintain public support and coalition cohesion. With

the current capabilities of the perceived military threats, doctrine should enable military forces to achieve the desired endstates, yet minimize unnecessary destruction of an enemy's economic infrastructure. Finally, to create conditions which contribute to a lasting peace, doctrine must enable the military to conduct its operations while retaining the moral high ground.

Creating the conditions for a lasting peace extends from doctrinal principles of operational military art to the tactical battlefield in terms of the way American forces fight. Historically, the heinous treatment of defeated armies and their civilian populations, perpetrated at the hands of callous victors, engendered animosity and hatred which produce the seeds for future war. For this reason, if no other, it is imperative that military operations reflect a sense of morality. In practice, military doctrine must embrace the concepts and methods described in the Geneva - Hague conventions, law of land warfare and the rules of engagement (ROE) applied to the particular campaign.

B. The Military Strategic Environment

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, identifies the military's first priority in the National Military Strategy: "Being ready to **fight and win** the nation's wars remains our foremost responsibility

and the prime considerations governing all our military activities.”⁷³ This is accomplished through the employment of U.S. forces using eight basic principles:

1. Clear Objectives - Decisive Force
2. Wartime Power Projection
3. Fight Combined and Fight Joint
4. Win the Information War
5. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
6. Two Major Regional Contingency Focus
7. Force Generation
8. Win the Peace.⁷⁴

This paper will explore the five principles most relevant to offensive operational doctrine.

(1) Clear Objectives - Decisive Force is the first basic principle in the NMS and stresses that “....in any application of force, military objectives will be clearly defined...We intend to commit sufficient force to achieve these objectives in a prompt and decisive manner.”⁷⁵

Joint doctrine focuses on the chain of command as the operative link between political and military strategic objectives and operational level military objectives. As Joint Pub 3-0 explains, “Directives flow from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.”⁷⁶ A common military doctrine serves as the foundation for the operational planning process. The planning process translates strategic guidance, and is used to continuously develop and communicate clear objectives so

they remain relevant and consistent throughout the chain of command, from the strategic to the tactical level.⁷⁷

Army doctrine uses the term, objective, to define the focus of the efforts of all forces towards a common goal.

It nests objectives from the strategic through the operational and tactical levels of war to ensure unity of effort in support of the strategic endstate. Army doctrine has developed patterns of operations, which can function as an outline for phasing operational objectives:

1. Project the force
2. Protect the force
3. Gain information dominance
4. Shape the battlespace
5. Decisive operations
6. Sustain the force⁷⁸

The Army intends to achieve the conditions conducive for a favorable termination of hostilities from military operations conducted during the decisive phase of operations.

Decisive Force is achieved by massing combat power, and by using that combined power to achieve decisive effects on the battlefield. The means to deliver the force are generated through the reserve and active components (including: air, land, sea and special operations forces), the other elements of national power (diplomatic, economic and informational) and from the coalitions that are formed with other governments.⁷⁹ Joint doctrine prescribes the ways of generating decisive force through:

1. Synergy
2. Simultaneity and Depth
3. Anticipation
4. Balance
5. Leverage
6. Timing and Tempo⁸⁰

Synergy is achieved by attacking the enemy's physical capabilities, moral and will. This is accomplished through symmetric and asymmetric combinations of forces and actions in the air, land and sea dimensions to achieve an overwhelming concentration of combat power.⁸¹

Simultaneity and depth are achieved through the concurrent application of operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels against the enemy's full array of capabilities and sources of strength.⁸² This is possible with the synergy achieved across the multiple dimensions of the battlefield environment.

Anticipation is used by the commander to plan and exploit developing situations. By gathering information and conducting a continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), commanders can anticipate which course of action the enemy is likely to make, and then use that information in his planning.⁸³

Balance refers to the commander's employment and use of the correct combinations of friendly forces to disrupt the enemy's balance of capabilities, while protecting his own.⁸⁴ If, for example, the theater commander can overwhelm an

enemy's air force and still retain his own, then he has created an imbalance of force capabilities.

Leverage is the exploitation of the imbalances of combat power across the dimensions of air, land, sea and space.

If, continuing the example above, the theater commander uses his dominance in air power to begin the destruction of the enemy's ground forces, he is using the air dimension in an asymmetric fashion to leverage the enemy.

Timing and tempo are the synchronization of friendly capabilities to maximize combat effects at a pace too rapid for the enemy to react. It refers to timing of the application of force and combat effects so they are felt by the enemy at the desired time.⁸⁵

(2) Wartime Power Projection -- Strategic mobility constraints will force doctrine in a direction that achieves decisive offensive objectives with lighter forces (equipment and size of the force). Fewer armored and mechanized forces will be available, resulting in a greater reliance on air and sea power projection because of their strategic mobility. This composition of forces will require the Army to fight with a greater reliance on joint and combined forces than any previous time in history.⁸⁶

(3) Fight Combined and Fight Joint -- This implies that commanders at every level must develop a joint vision of the battlefield to ensure unity of effort. An Army doctrine consistent with Joint doctrine ensures commanders

and planners have a common ideology for understanding how the service components can work together. From this common ideology, the joint campaign plan provides clear objectives and synchronization of assets to implement joint operability.⁸⁷ This doctrinal consistency and common ideology should help to prevent the problems of dissimilar visions which led to the missteps at Leyte Gulf in World War II.

(4) Win the Information War -- Controlling the information domain encompasses structures, systems, procedures and products intended for use by the enemy.⁸⁸ It is in the interests of commanders to defeat the enemy's command and control process, and take away his ability to operate in a coordinated way. Separating an enemy's force from their commander, helps to break down the enemy's unit moral and cohesion, and his will to fight.

(5) Win the Peace.

The strategic goal of any military objective is conflict termination and a lasting peace on favorable terms to the U.S. and its allies. It is important to begin to win the peace at the outset of the conflict, not as an afterthought. As such, doctrine must support military operations in conjunction with the work of non-governmental organizations, and other elements of national power, throughout the campaign, to aid in the transition to peace.⁸⁹

IV. A Comparison of Joint and Army Offensive Operations

Doctrine at the Operational Level.

A. Contrast of Joint and Army operational scope

Joint doctrine looks at the battlefield from a wider operational vantage point than Army doctrine, and with good reason. Joint doctrine must combine the capabilities of air, sea, space and special operations to attain required operational and strategic objectives.⁹⁰ In war the aim is to defeat the enemy's operational COGs as directly and rapidly as possible, in order to ultimately expose and defeat his strategic COG.⁹¹ To defeat the enemy's operational COGs, Joint doctrine uses the most appropriate armed service as its main effort, and the other services as supporting efforts.⁹²

The Army's operational scope is focused on the close fight -- where ground forces are in contact with the enemy, and in the areas of an operation that can influence the close fight.⁹³ From this point of view, Army doctrine does not consider the possibility of ground forces becoming a supporting effort to another service fighting the deep fight as the main effort. At both the tactical and operational levels of war, Army doctrine espouses the belief that the capabilities of the other services are only to be used to help ground forces win their battles.⁹⁴

B. Defeating enemy operational COGs, the direct and indirect approaches

Joint doctrine is very clear about its preferred method of attacking an enemy's COG, "To the extent possible, JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] attack enemy COGs directly."⁹⁵ It further elaborates that Joint commanders should designate the most appropriate element (land, sea or air) as the main effort to attack the enemy COGs. Only if attacking the enemy COG directly causes a commander to attack into the enemy's strength, should the commander use an indirect approach.⁹⁶

In contrast, Army doctrine focuses on attacking enemy COGs through successive decisive points.⁹⁷ This method is accomplished when ground forces attack those enemy weaknesses which lead to a position of advantage for subsequent attacks on his operational COGs.⁹⁸ Army doctrine stresses repeatedly, that all other efforts (deep operations, interdiction, etc.) in a campaign, battle or engagement are in support of the ground force that is designated to rupture the enemy's defenses and exploit him to fullest advantage.⁹⁹

C. Decisiveness of offensive operations.

Army doctrine is consistent with Joint doctrine in that only offensive operations can produce decisive results, and that the operational ends establish conditions that support the political aim.¹⁰⁰ Joint Pub 3-0 and FM 100-5 point out that the purpose of decisive offensive operations is to cause the enemy to conform to our will, and to overcome his ability to resist.¹⁰¹ The military ways and means that are best suited to accomplishing this purpose should, in most cases, become the main effort of the attack.¹⁰² All supporting efforts should contribute to the success of the main effort. Some military leaders have termed this concept as nesting.

Unfortunately, Army doctrine is not consistent with Joint doctrine regarding who can be selected as the main effort for accomplishing the destruction of the enemy's operational COGs. Joint doctrine states that in some situations, air or sea power may become the main effort, with the Army in support. Army doctrine, however, insists that decisive operations only occur in the close fight with ground maneuver forces, and all other elements of military power are in support.¹⁰³ If Army doctrine remains inconsistent, it could adversely affect the coherence of the JFC's campaign and operational plan.

The purpose of the main effort is to accomplish the goal of the operational objective. If it is the destruction or

defeat of a mobile reserve, and this can be accomplished by air power, then air power must become the main effort, with ground forces in support. The supporting effort missions are nested in the operational mission by the tasks and purposes given to create conditions which contribute to the success of the main effort.

If the mission of the main effort (air) is to destroy the enemy's operational reserve, the task given to the ground component commander may be to seize an objective (an enemy's decisive point) to cause his reserve to counterattack. This purpose is nested in the mission of the main effort, because it exposes the enemy to the effects of air power; enabling the main effort to accomplish its mission. The absence of this possible approach in Army doctrine could inhibit a joint vision of the campaign, and endanger the operational endstate.

D. The nature of offensive operations in either of the MRCs is likely to be nonlinear.

Both Joint and Army doctrine recognize that nonlinear operations are possible in future wars.¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately, only Joint doctrine indicates that the U.S. military should expect a future experience similar to that of Operation Just Cause in Panama.¹⁰⁵ It is an example of how rapid, decisive and complex nonlinear operations are likely to occur in the future. Joint doctrine suggests that the freedom of action

to conduct nonlinear ground operations can be achieved by dominating the air and sea dimensions.¹⁰⁶ Army doctrine recognizes that the potential for nonlinear operations may exist and that these operations give commanders additional flexibility, but doctrine does not indicate how the commander can operate in a nonlinear environment.¹⁰⁷

Joint Pub 3-0 observes that the synchronization of maneuver and interdiction synchronize in a complimentary fashion and can achieve the Joint Force Commander's campaign objectives.¹⁰⁸ The combined effects of maneuver and interdiction serve to mutually enhance security and weapon systems effects, and to create a decisive force by massing effects through the multiple dimensions of combat (e.g., air, sea and land).

The inconsistency of doctrines in the concept of operations in a nonlinear environment is highlighted when Joint Pub 3-0 states, "...JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa."¹⁰⁹ FM 100-5's chapter on *Conduct of Operations* does not contain methods for conducting nonlinear operations, but it does offer some possibilities for attacking the enemy's operational COG more directly. JFCs could use the Army's forte of conducting operational maneuver warfare in a fast paced linear environment to enhance interdiction operations. Furthermore, the Army could modify its doctrine to address

the kinds of operations that would enhance its planning flexibility.

Before Army doctrine can grasp the art of operations in a consistent way with Joint doctrine, it must accept two aspects of maneuver. First, that the JFCs' preferred method of attacking an enemy's COG is directly, and it can be accomplished through air power. Second, that when air power dominates the air dimension, it is a form of maneuver.¹¹⁰ It is the effect of dominating the air space that allows air power to gain positional advantage over ground forces.¹¹¹ This definition violates the Army's traditional interpretations of maneuver, but meets the spirit of the effects of maneuver which is to "Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power."¹¹²

With a new understanding of Joint maneuver, the Army's operational concepts of *Forms of Offensive Maneuver* could be used to achieve the kind of synchronization of maneuver described in Joint doctrine. The forms of offensive maneuver, penetration and turning movement, contained in the FM 100-5 (draft) could be used in consonance with air power to cause the enemy to react in ways that make him vulnerable to aerial attack.¹¹³ Turning movements, using amphibious, airborne and/or air assault forces identified in FM 100-5 (May 1986) could be used to exploit the advantages of

nonlinear warfare by opening up a second operational front in a theater of operations.¹¹⁴

Deep penetrations, designed to seize or destroy an enemy's operational decisive point, would likely cause the enemy to become vulnerable to air attacks when reacting to the penetration. Turning movements could be used not only for the traditional purpose of causing the enemy's front line units to abandon their prepared defensive positions, but also to establish conditions for an attack directly on an enemy's operational COG when it moves to counterattack or withdrawal. Aerial turning movements which include elements of Army air and ground assets, in conjunction with air interdiction could be used to rapidly gain a positional advantage over the enemy's COG, or to strike the COG directly.

If Army doctrine becomes consistent with Joint doctrine, it would give the JFC and his staff another approach to the operational art of war. Commanders and staffs should not look at the battlefield only from the perspective of what support operations do to enhance the close fight, but in terms of how all aspects of battlespace can be managed to defeat the enemy's COG. In the regions of the world containing the two MRCs, offensive operational maneuver could be decisive in the deep battle as well as the close battle, and the main effort for some phases of the operation should belong to air power.

V. Implications for the Future

A. Breaking the dogma

Before the U.S. military can achieve a significant improvement in the performance of joint operations, the Army must adopt a vision consistent with Joint doctrine. The Army must accept in its doctrine the direct approach as a means to defeating an enemy's COG, and it must also accept the role as a supporting effort to one of its sister services when required. This fundamental change in vision can lead to a more creative and integrated planning capability, and to an operational art with greater potential than presently exists.

This consistent doctrinal vision of the battlefield that includes a better appreciation of friendly capabilities and how to integrate their effects will lead to an improved planning ability for Army and Joint staffs. It will provide commanders and their staffs greater flexibility for identifying potential problems and finding sound solutions in dynamic, complex environments and for developing courses of action that fully exploit enemy vulnerabilities.

Great leaders like Generals Douglas MacArthur and George S. Patton possessed a genius for joint operational art. They broke away from purely ground schemes of maneuver as a way to greatly increase the scale and speed of offensive operations. A consistent Army - Joint doctrine would

contain the operational art concepts that enable commanders and their staffs to reach their full potential, performing nonlinear operations on the scale of OPERATION CHROMITE for the Inchon invasion,¹¹⁵ and joint exploitation and pursuit operations on the scale and speed of 3rd Army's race across France during World War II.¹¹⁶ The planning and execution of these types of operations could produce the speed and decisiveness necessary to support the political realities that come into play of when U.S. forces are committed to a theater of conflict.

The U.S. military will ultimately move towards more integrated joint operations to attack and defeat enemy operational COGs in future conflicts. The successful coordination and cooperation in future operations will depend on commanders and their staffs using a single doctrinal vision. The Army may continue to write doctrine to address those operations that are primarily executed by the Army, however, a single unified doctrine is required to standardize the planning and execution of joint operations in the deep battle area.

Doctrine alone may well not change the thinking and professional convictions of commanders and their staffs. An integrated Army doctrine that is consistent with Joint doctrine must have imbedded into its vision, a common understanding of:

1. Military theory of how military actions on the battlefield are used to produce a desired result.
2. The military missions that are derived from the NSS and NMS
3. The blurring of service roles and missions in the deep battle area
4. Sister service technical capabilities and operational methods

These areas of common understanding should be integrated into all academic military curriculums that include instruction in operational art.

B. Institutional challenges

The increased integration of the joint deep-battle area places a greater emphasis on the purchase of equipment that is fully interoperable between the services. Commanders and their staffs require common command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) for common situational awareness and operational cooperation.¹¹⁷ Soldiers, sailors and airmen require common target acquisition/designation and sensor/shooter systems to enhance their integration on the battlefield.¹¹⁸

Challenges for senior military leaders loom in the form of service budget cuts and intense inner-service rivalry. These leaders must resist the rationale that if one service allows another to encroach upon its roles and missions, it will lose funding. It will take a great deal of moral courage on the part of the senior army leadership to make the changes required to move towards a truly joint

environment. It can be done, and it must be done, if the U.S. military plans to remain relevant in the twenty first century.

VI. Conclusions

This paper has looked at several issues in answering the question **Is FM 100-5 (draft) January 1997, concept of decisive offensive operations consistent with Joint Pub 3-0?**

It is apparent that in operations involving an indirect approach against a succession of enemy decisive points, the two doctrines are consistent. In the event that enemy COGs are vulnerable to a direct approach of attack, Army doctrine is not in unison with Joint doctrine.

The doctrines of the Air Force and the Navy have influenced Joint doctrine's position in favor of the direct approach, and in using air or sea power as the main effort in some phases of the campaign for achieving operational objectives. The Air Force posits that an attack on the operational COGs is the most preferred operational method of achieving political aims.¹¹⁹ This is best achieved through asymmetric attacks on ground targets from the air in consonance with supporting ground attacks.¹²⁰ The Navy's influence on Joint doctrine has been on the capabilities of nonlinear warfare and force projection from the sea.¹²¹ The ability to open up a second operational front poses a

dilemma for the enemy, and significantly increases operational tempo. The adoption of these concepts into Joint doctrine increases the complexity of operational art and challenges the Army to adapt to a variant form of (air and sea) maneuver.

Potential enemies in the MRC regions are vulnerable to the kinds of military campaigns that Joint doctrine prefers, "To the extent possible, JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] attack enemy COGs directly."¹²² This is possible with U.S. and coalition militaries' ability to dominate the air and sea dimensions. The enemy's operational COGs are exposed to air attacks as suggested by AFM 1-1¹²³, and by amphibious and vertical turning movements identified in the 1986 version of FM 100-5.¹²⁴ In these kinds of operations, ground maneuver missions would support air and/or amphibious operations.

The direct approach in operational warfare, when possible, supports the NSS and NMS desire for a rapid and decisive conclusion to hostilities, and for a smooth transition to a lasting peace. Ground intensive wars that attack and maneuver through a series of decisive points, and then on to the COGs themselves, tend to take longer and wreak greater destruction. The tremendous loss of life, and destruction of infrastructure so prevalent in ground intensive warfare impedes the NSS goals of security and prosperity.¹²⁵

These findings suggest that U.S. Army doctrine should include operational concepts for how ground forces could support air and sea forces in a direct attack on enemy operational COGs. Included in these concepts should be the theoretical and historical underpinnings as to how direct attacks are possible, and to understand when the direct approach is not the preferred method of offensive operations.

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³ A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., February 1996, 14 and National Military Strategy, 1995, pg. ii

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